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CONTRACTS FUNDING AND 
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ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES OF 
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1. No right to a non-conforming use 
is gained when the landowner applies for or 
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-S issued a building permit to construct a 
>roposed building. Whitfield v. Seabrook, 
!59 S.C. 66, 190 S.E.2d 743 (1972); Arcelo 
Reproduction Co. v. Modugno, 31 App. Div.2d 
i42, 296 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1968); Brougher v. 
loard of Public Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 Pac. 
87 (1928); Schneider v. Lazarov, 216 Tenn. 
., 390 S.W.2d 197 (1965); Omaha v. Glissman, 
51 Neb. 895, 39 N.W*2d 928 (1949). This is 
rue even if there is an unwarranted delay in 
.he issuance of the permit prior to a change 
n zoning. Spector v. Building Inspector of 
llton, 250 Mass. 63, 145-N.E. 265 (1924); 
ajarian Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of 
eview, 208 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1965). 
2. Where a zoning planning board fails 
o state reasons or make findings of fact in 
upport of its decision, the appropriate 
isposition of the case by a court is not to 
everse the decision of the planning board, 
ut rather to remand it to the board for a 
ew hearing or to make proper findings of 
act. Application of Parmadale Development, 
nc. v. The Planning Board of the Town of 
arraa, 316 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1970); Blair v. 
pning Board of Appeals, City of Chicago, 
28 N.E.2d 555 (111. 1967); Miernyk v. Board 
f Zoning Appeals of City of Morgantown, 
81 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 1971). 
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CARL J. NEMELKA 
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S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E 
O F T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County decreeing that 
the respondent has the right to construct a mobile home 
park on respondent's property located within Salt Lake 
County and that the Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners and the Salt Lake Planning Commis-
sion are estopped to deny the right of respondent to 
construct said mobile home park, and directing Darrel 
D. Maynes, Director, Salt Lake County Building and 
Zoning Enforcement Department, to issue a building 
permit for the construction of a mobile home park on 
said property. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Two cases involving substantially the same issues 
were consolidated for trial. After receiving testimony 
and evidence, the court held that the respondent had 
the right to construct a mobile home park on respond-
ent's land located in an area which is not zoned for 
said purpose. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's judg-
ment and for an order reinstating the decisions of the 
Salt Lake Planning Commission and the Board of Salt 
Lake County Commissioners denying respondent's ap-
plication for a permit to construct a mobile home park. 
2 
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S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
The respondent, Contracts Funding and Mortgage 
Exchange, a Utah corporation, contracted to purchase 
approximately forty-five acres of unzoned real prop-
erty located within the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, on or about October 17, 1972, said property be-
ing purchased through a court supervised estate sale. 
On December 4, 1972, the Board of Salt Lake 
County Commissioners conducted a public hearing for 
the purpose of acting on the Salt Lake County Plan-
ning Commission's recommendations for the zoning of 
all county land unzoned as of that date. Respondent's 
representative appeared at said hearing and requested 
that the Board of Commissioners not zone the subject 
forty-five acres at that time, which request was granted. 
Thereafter, respondent submitted a preliminary 
planning application for a conditional use permit to 
the Planning Commission. 
On March 13, 1973, the Salt Lake County Plan-
ning Commission met to consider respondent's applica-
tion. The Planning Commission conditionally approved 
respondent's application at said meeting. Thereafter, 
the Planning Commission directed the Planning Staff 
to reschedule a hearing on respondent's preliminary 
application for March 27, 1973, because local residents 
had not been notified by the Planning Staff prior to 
the hearing. (R-36) The March 27, 1973, hearing re-
sulted in the respondent's preliminary application being 
verbally denied. This was followed by written notice 
3 
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of denial on April 6, 1973. Respondent appealed the 
Planning Commission's adverse ruling to the Board of 
Salt Lake County Commissioners. 
On May 22, 1973, respondent completed the trans-
action with regard to the purchase of the 45 acres of 
land from the probate court. Thereafter, on June 21, 
1973, almost three months after its application had 
been denied, respondent entered into a contract for the 
purchase of an additional seventeen acres of property 
located in the City of West Jordan. (Exhibit 7-P) 
On or about August 7, 1973, respondent delivered 
a document (Exhibit 3-P) to the Director of the Salt 
Lake County Building and Zoning Enforcement De-
partment demanding that he issue a building permit 
for the construction of a mobile home park on respond-
ent's property and stating that a conditional use permit 
was not required from the County Planning Commis-
sion. The Director refused to issue a building permit 
to respondent. 
Thereafter, on August 9, 1973, respondent's ap-
peal was denied and its forty-five acres of county land 
was zoned A-5 by the Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners, which zoning classification does not 
allow the construction of a mobile home park. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D IN F I N D I N G 
T H A T T H E P L A N N I N G COMMISSION A N D 
4 
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T H E P L A N N I N G S T A F F A C T E D I M P R O P -
E R L Y A N D U N L A W F U L L Y I N G I V I N G 
N O T I C E OF A R E H E A R I N G ON P L A I N -
T I F F ' S A P P L I C A T I O N A N D I N H O L D I N G 
T H E R E H E A R I N G OF MARCH 27, 1973, A N D 
I N D E N Y I N G T H E C O N D I T I O N A L U S E 
P E R M I T ON A P R I L 6, 1973. 
The Lower Court's Finding of Fact No. 7 states: 
"7. That the Planning Commission did not by 
any official or other proper action withdraw, 
cancel or otherwise modify its approval of the 
action taken in the public hearing on March 13, 
1973, and did not by official and proper action 
set said application for hearing again on March 
27, 1973, or authorize the Planning Staff so to 
do, but that the Planning Staff, improperly and 
unlawfully, did give notice of rehearing on said 
Application for March 27, 1973, after which 
hearing, the Planning Commission did, on April 
6, 1973, withdraw the conditional use permit." 
There is no testimony in the record that the Plan-
ning Staff or the Planning Commission acted "im-
properly or unlawfully" by rescheduling the hearing 
on the application to March 17, 1973. The transcript 
is devoid of any reference to any ordinance, statute, 
or case precedent which would indicate that the pro-
cedures followed by the Planning Staff and Commis-
sion were improper. 
Title 22, Chapter 31, Section 2(4), Revised Or-
dinances of Salt Lake County, Utah, 1966, gives the 
Planning Commission the discretion of holding or not 
5 
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holding a public hearing when considering applica-
tions for conditional use permits. In all cases the Plan-
ning Commission, under its own rules, does not hold 
public hearings on such applications; however, it re-
quires notification of hearings be given to residents 
located within 300 feet of the applicant's property. 
The testimony of Kenneth Jones at page 36 and 
37 of the transcript clearly indicates that notice of the 
original hearing was not given residents within 300 feet 
of respondent's property as was the customary practice 
and policy of the Planning Commission. When the 
Planning Commission discovered this irregularity, it 
directed the Planning Staff to reschedule the hearing 
on the matter and to notify local residents of the new 
hearing date. I t is well settled that an administrative 
body may reconsider and modify decisions made on the 
basis of an irregular procedure. The general law is 
stated in 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, at page 
336: 
"Regardless of whether a determination is or 
is not deemed to be quasi-judicial, and even 
though the court might otherwise take the view 
denying the existence of power in administra-
tive agencies to reconsider or modify their de-
terminations, the courts hold or recognize that 
administrative agencies may consider and modify 
the determinations or correct errors on the 
ground of . . . irregularity in vital matters." 
I t is also well settled that an administrative agency 
must follow its own rules and that any action taken 
by an administrative agency in derogation of such rules 
may be illegal. 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 
6 
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350. In the matter herein the Planning Commission 
failed to follow its own rules with regard to notifica-
tion of local residents of the hearing on respondent's 
application. Therefore, appellants would submit that 
the Planning Commission not only had the right to re-
hear respondent's application for a mobile home park, 
but also had the duty to rehear it in order to correct 
the irregularity in the prior hearing which could only 
be done by notifying the local residents and rehearing 
the matter. 
After hearing both sides of the matter on March 
27, 1973, and after considering the new evidence pro-
duced by the local residents who opposed the construc-
tion of a mobile home park on the subject 45 acres, the 
Planning Commission denied respondent's application. 
In so doing, the Planning Commission acted within its 
authority by following its policy of requiring that notice 
be given to residents of hearings on applications for 
permits to construct mobile home parks* 
Furthermore, action of the Planning Commission 
on March 13, 1973, was provisional approval of the 
preliminary site plans — not final approval. 
Section 2-3-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, provides: 
"The Planning Commission shall review the 
application map and plans of the proposed mo-
bile home park, considering the reports of other 
departments and agencies together with the pro-
visions of this code and shall approve (condi-
tionally approve), amend and approve or may 
disapprove the applications as submitted." 
7 
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That administrative agencies may reconsider pro-
visional decisions is well established. The rule, enunci-
ated in 2 Am. Jur . 2d § 522, Administrative Law, p. 
331 and 332, states: 
"Even apart from any statutory provisions 
expressly authorizing modification, administra-
tive determinations are subject to reconsidera-
tion and change where they have not passed be-
yond the control of the administrative agency, 
as where the determinations are not final, but 
interlocutory, incomplete, provisional, or not yet 
effective, or where the powers and jurisdiction 
of the administrative agency are continuing in 
nature. While a proceeding is pending before a 
tribunal, there is no limit to the power of such 
tribunal to review any rulings it may have made, 
or to permit a reargument upon any proposition 
involved." 
Thus, the Planning Commission had jurisdiction to re-
hear respondent's application as it had only condition-
ally approved the application on March 13, 1973 and 
still had jurisdiction over the matter. 
I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D I N G 
A N D C O N C L U D I N G T H A T R E S P O N D E N T 
R E L I E D TO I T S D E T R I M E N T ON T H E 
P L A N N I N G COMMISSION'S ACT O F M A R C H 
13,1973. 
The Lower Court's Finding of Fact No. 6 sets 
forth respondent's detrimental reliance on the Planning 
8 
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Commission's conditional approval of their application 
to construct a mobile home park or subdivision. 
Finding of Fact No. 6: 
"That relying upon said approval of the con-
ditional use permit for the approximate 45 acres 
of land, the plaintiff did acquire 17 acres im-
mediately to the south and abutting and adjoin-
ing the subject property at a cost of approxi-
mately $95,000.00, the said 17 acres being situ-
ate within the city limits of West Jordan, Utah, 
and being zoned for mobile homes, and further 
did acquire the additional 17 acres in order to 
develop the approximate 17 acres as one mobile 
home subdivision or unit."1 
Apparently the lower court reasoned that the 
Planning Commission's conditional approval of re-
spondent's application on March 13, 1973, was a step 
which reasonably led the respondent to expend monies 
to purchase 17 acres of adjoining property in the City 
of West Jordan. However, this finding is not sup-
ported by the record. Nowhere in the record does it 
show that respondent expended any money during the 
period of March 13, 1973, through April 6, 1973, to 
further its interests in the 45 acres of land it already 
owned. The lower court apparently assumed that the 
iThe court, in its Findings of Fact, uses the term mobile 
home subdivision when referring to respondent's application, but 
uses the term mobile home park in the Conclusions of Law and 
in its Judgment. The term "mobile home subdivision" refers 
to the actual sale of the fee title in the land which is not the 
case with a mobile home park. Mobile home subdivisions are 
not permitted in any zone in Salt Lake County. In any event, 
respondent is not entitled to a mobile home subdivision as he 
has not attempted to comply with the state and county sub-
division requirements. 
9 
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purchase of the additional 17 acres of land occurred 
before respondent was notified on April 6, 1973, that 
the Planning Commission had denied its application. 
However, Exhibit "7-P" makes it clear that the con-
tract to purchase the 17 additional acres in West Jor-
dan was entered into on June 21, 1973, some three 
months after the Planning Commission had conducted 
the hearing of March 27, 1973, and had denied res-
pondent's application for a conditional use permit. The 
transcript doesn't indicate that respondent expended 
one dime in furtherance of its project during the period 
of March 13, 1973 through April 6, 1973. At the time 
of purchase of the 17 acres in West Jordan, respondent 
was awaiting determination by the Board of County 
Commissioners on its appeal of the Planning Commis-
sion's action of April 6, 1973. Respondent was also 
aware at the time of purchase of the additional acreage 
that the original 45 acres of Salt Lake County prop-
erty was subject to be zoned at any time. 
In addition, the original decision of March 13, 
1973, approving respondent's application for a mobile 
home park was a conditional one and the Planning 
Commission still had to receive, analyze and review 
comments transmitted to it by the Building and Zoning 
Enforcement Department, the City-County Board of 
Health, the Surveyor's Office, the Flood Control Di-
rector, the Fire Department, and any other public 
agency or officers determined by the Planning Com-
mission to have an interest in the proposed park prior 
to final approval of the application. Section 2-3-4(2) 
10 
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of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966. 
Thus, even during the period from March 13 to April 
6, respondent had no final decision from the Planning 
Commission on which it could have reasonably relied 
on to take further steps to expand the proposed park. 
The only other expenses which the record shows 
respondent incurred with regard to its application for 
a mobile home park were the initial purchase of the 45 
acres and the expenses related to filing its preliminary 
site plan. Surely the filing of a preliminary site plan 
does not bring an applicant within the scope of the 
doctrine of detrimental reliance for if this were the 
law every person filing a preliminary application could 
claim detrimental reliance if his application were denied. 
See Livoli v. Planning Board of Marlborough, 347 
Mass. 331, 97 N. E. 2d 785 (1964). Similarly, the 
courts have held that estoppel or detrimental reliance 
will not lie when the only action taken by an applicant 
is the purchase of real property with the expectation of 
using it in a particular way. 
In the case of O'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 Cal. App. 
2d 347, 146 P.2d 985, the court held that the fact that 
a party makes a large investment in a city lot which 
at the time of its purchase is free of restrictions, with 
intent to use it for business purposes, does not in-
validate a zoning ordinance subsequently adopted re-
stricting the use of the property to residential purposes. 
In Price v. Schwafel, 92 Ca. App.2d 77, 206 P.2d 
683, (1949), the court dealt with a similar problem. In 
11 
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that case, the plaintiffs owned property outside the 
boundaries of the City of Palo Alto which was zoned 
so as to permit the construction of a shopping center, 
the use contemplated by plaintiffs. Plaintiff's property 
was then annexed by the City of Palo Alto. Ten days 
later, an interim zoning ordinance was adopted by the 
City permitting the use of plaintiff's property as a 
shopping center. The matter of rezoning plaintiff's 
property came before the city council and planning 
commission numerous times during the next eight 
months, when it was finally zoned residential. Three 
days before the final action of the council, the plaintiff 
made application for a buliding permit which was not 
granted. The Court ruled that the rezoning of the land 
in question was within the legislative discretion of the 
City Council and the property owners' appeal was dis-
missed. The Court also drew a distinction between 
cases wherein a building permit has been applied for, 
granted, and then monies expended in reliance on the 
building permit, and cases where the permit was not 
issued. The Court stated at page 687: 
". . . The exception noted in the foregoing 
authorities that a permit would not be revoked 
in those cases where the licensee "had done some-
thing under the license from which the mere 
privilege would ripen into a vested right", does 
not exist in those cases like the one before us, 
where no permit has ever been issued. In such 
cases there is no opportunity for any privilege 
to ripen into a vested right, for the reason that 
no privilege in the sense used in the authorities 
cited, is acquired until a permit has been issued." 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See also Brett v. Building Commissioner, 250 Mass. 73, 
145 N. E. 269. 
The lower court, in its memorandum decision, in-
dicated that the court's decision for respondent was 
made in part as a result of finding that the case came 
squarely within the case of Gibbons and Reed v. North 
Salt Lake, 19 U.2d, 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967). How-
ever, the appellants would submit the Gibbons and 
Reed case is not in point. That case dealt with certain 
zoning and excavation ordinances enacted by the City 
of North Salt Lake. I t involved four parcels of prop-
erty that were unzoned prior to 1957 and used prior 
thereto and after the enactment of the 1957 zoning 
ordinance as a gravel pit. This court determined that 
the property owner had a valid non-conforming use 
which had not been abandoned and because the land 
itself was a diminishing asset, it would be confiscatory 
to allow the zoning law to invalidate the non-conform-
ing use. In the case before the court, respondent does 
not contend it had a valid non-conforming use or that 
it relied in any way on any existing status of the use 
of the land. Here, there is no evidence respondent ex-
pended any money in reliance on the original decision 
of the Planning Commission approving the mobile 
home park or any evidence that respondent has suff-
ered any detriment or loss by the failure of it being 
able to use the additional 17 acres purchased for a 
mobile home park. In fact, the land may well be more 
valuable for other purposes. 
13 
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I l l 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D I N G 
T H A T P L A I N T I F F W O U L D NOT H A V E 
B E E N R E Q U I R E D TO O B T A I N A CONDI-
T I O N A L U S E P E R M I T . 
The Lower Court found that "the land in question 
was unzoned and the respondent would not have been 
required to obtain a conditional use permit." Page 3, 
Lines 24 to 26, Findings of Fact. (R-3). This finding 
is contrary to the clear meaning of the Mobile Home 
Park Ordinance which was intended to apply to all 
mobile home parks regardless of their intended loca-
tions in the County. The ordinance as pertinent states: 
"Sec. 2-3-4. Application for a Permit. Upon 
receipt of an application for a conditional use 
permit to establish or enlarge a mobile home 
park, the Planning Commission and the other 
agencies concerned therewith shall make the nec-
essary investigation, review and inspection of the 
application, the plot plans, the site and the pro-
posed facilities to determine whether the estab-
lishment or the enlargement of the park will 
meet the requirements of this Chapter. 
(1) Before a Conditional Use Permit for a 
mobile home park can be issued, plans and speci-
fications shall be submitted to the Planning 
Commission. 
The plans of the proposed park must include de-
tails of water supply and waste disposal systems, the 
drainage plan of the park, the location and size of all 
public utility lines, plans and specifications of all build-
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ings, improvements and facilities to be constructed 
along with eleven other specific statutory requirements. 
The information which the ordinance requires an ap-
plicant for a mobile home park permit to submit to 
the Planning Commission does not relate to the loca-
tion of the mobile home park within the County, but 
rather, relates to the structure and regulation of the 
facilities within the mobile home park wherever located. 
Nowhere does the language of the ordinance exclude 
mobile home parks which are proposed to be located in 
unzoned areas in the County. The ordinance also re-
quires approval of the proposed mobile home park by 
the Building and Zoning Enforcement Department, 
the City-County Board of Health, the Surveyor's 
Office, the Flood Control Director, and the Fire De-
partment prior to the issuance of a permit. The pen-
alty section of the ordinance does not exclude from its 
coverage mobile home parks in unzoned areas, but 
rather, applies to all mobile home parks. Section 2-3-2 
states: 
"I t shall be unlawful for any person to construct, 
maintain or operate a mobile home park within 
the county unless such person shall first obtain a 
license and permit therefore except that . . . " 
None of the enumerated exceptions include locations 
of the mobile home park in the unzoned area. Read-
ing these provisions of the ordinance as a whole, ap-
pellants submit that it is clear that the Mobile Home 
Park Ordinance, which is not even part of the zoning 
ordinance, was intended to regulate all applications for 
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mobile home parks and not just those in which the in-
tended location of the park happened to be in an 
unzoned area of the County. 
I V 
T H E ACTION T A K E N BY T H E BOARD O F 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ON A U G U S T 9, 
1973, Z O N I N G R E S P O N D E N T ' S P R O P E R T Y 
A-5 W A S A P R O P E R E X E R C I S E O F T H E 
S T A T E S P O L I C E P O W E R A N D NOT S H O W N 
TO H A V E B E E N A R B I T R A R Y OR U N R E A -
SONABLE. 
The legislature has delegated the power to zone to 
Salt Lake County so that the need for a protective plan 
might be met and has provided means for the pro-
tection of private property through notice and public 
hearings. U.C.A. (1953), 17-27-1. 
In pursuing its authority to zone a county, a 
county commission shall perform a legislative function 
and has wide discretion. The action of the zoning 
authority is endowed with a strong presumption of 
validity and the courts will not interfere with a commis-
sion's action unless it clearly appears to be beyond its 
powers or is unconstitutional Gayland vs. Salt Lake 
County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633. 
A presumption of validity and reasonableness at-
tends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. In 8 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec. 
25.295, it is further said: 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The presumption of the reasonableness, valid-
ity and constitutionality of ordinances applies 
fully to zoning ordinances and amendments of 
zoning ordinances. Every intendment in favor 
of their validity is to be indulged. This is partic-
ularly true since zoning is governmental and leg-
islative in character, and constitutes an exercise 
of its police power to promote the public welfare. 
I t is presumed that the zoning power has been 
exercised reasonably by the zoning ordinance 
and that the ordinance is for purposes and with-
in the scope of the police power. That is to say, 
it is presumed that such an ordinance is designed 
to promote the public welfare. The court will 
presume that in enacting a zoning ordinance the 
(city council) acted with full knowledge of rele-
vant conditions and circumstances . . . " 
The action taken by the Board of Salt Lake 
County Commissioners on August 9, 1973, with refer-
ence to respondent's property is unassailable. The 
validity of the Zoning ordinance itself has not been 
questioned by the respondent. However, in light of the 
fact that any monies expended by respondent were 
either in preparation of filing a preliminary site plan 
with the Planning Commission or with the purchase of 
acreage outside the jurisdictional limits of the County, 
the Board's action in zoning respondents forty-five 
acres is legislative in nature and should be presumed 
valid and reasonable by this Honorable Court. 
The Board of Salt Lake County Commissioners 
action of passing subject ordinance effectively invali-
dates respondents argument that a conditional use per-
mit is not required in order to construct a mobile home 
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park on respondents property. Said property is pres-
ently zoned A-5 and Planning Commission approval is 
necessary for respondent to construct its mobile home 
park. 
V 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N ORDER-
I N G T H E D I R E C T O R O F T H E SALT L A K E 
COUNTY B U I L D I N G A N D Z O N I N G E N -
F O R C E M E N T D E P A R T M E N T TO I S S U E A 
B U I L D I N G P E R M I T TO R E S P O N D E N T . 
The Lower Court ordered Darrel Maynes, Di-
rector of the Salt Lake County Building and Zoning 
Department, to issue to respondent a building permit 
to construct a mobile home park. Even assuming the 
subsequent action to the March 13, 1973, order of the 
Planning Commission conditionally approving respond-
ent's application for a mobile home park is invalid, 
respondent would still have to meet the further re-
quirements of the ordinance before being entitled to 
a building permit. The effect of the lower court's order 
requiring the immediate issuance of a building permit 
would be to allow respondent to avoid the require-
ments of the ordinance such as approval of the Fire 
Department and Board of Health. Furthermore, the 
lower court order requiring the issuance of the build-
ing permit to respondent has the effect of denying 
residents in the area opposed to the mobile home park 
the opportunity to appeal the original decision of the 
Planning Commission. Therefore, appellants would 
submit that if this Court upholds the judgment of the 
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lower court requiring reinstatement of the original 
Planning Commission decision, conditionally approving 
respondent's application the judgment should be 
amended to delete the requirement of the immediate 
issuance of a building permit so that respondent may 
be required to comply with the further requirements of 
the ordinance and to allow residents in the area an 
opportunity to appeal to the County Commission the 
original decision of the Planning Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
I t is respectfully submitted that the Salt Lake 
County Mobile Home Ordinance has county-wide ap-
plication to both zoned and unzoned land; that a permit 
to construct a mobile home park (whether said permit 
is referred to as a conditional use permit or by some 
other name) and submission of a final site development 
plan are prerequisites for obtaining a building permit; 
that the Planning Commission action of March 13, 
1973, was voidable due to the lack of notice to local 
residents; and that the Planning Commission had the 
right and obligation to rehear respondent's application. 
The Lower Court erroneously held that respondent 
relied to its detriment by contracting to purchase sev-
enteen acres of land located outside the jurisdiction 
of Salt Lake County some three months after an ad-
verse ruling on its application for a permit to con-
struct a mobile home park by the Planning Commis-
sion. Respondent's own action of appealing the Plan-
ning Commission's decision of March 27, 1973, demon-
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strates that it was aware of the administrative pro-
cedures required in order to ultimately obtain a build-
ing permit. Respondent was hopeful that the Board 
of County Commissioners would reverse the Planning 
Commission's decision of March 27, 1973. However, 
respondent's decision to purchase the West Jordan 
property was made knowing full well that the Planning 
Commission disapproved of its preliminary site plans 
as submitted and that the Board of County Commis-
sioners still had to act on the appeal. 
Subsequent action by the Board of County Com-
missioners zoning subject forty-five acres on August 
9, 1973, was valid legislative action which was taken 
prior to the initiation of the lawsuit and causes 
respondent's argument in whole to be moot. 
For these reasons appellants ask that the decision 
of the lower court be reversed and the decisions of the 
Planning Commission and the Salt Lake County Com-
mission denying respondent's application for a permit 
to build a mobile home park be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CARL J . N E M E L K A 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
J O H N G. A V E R Y 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney 
R A L P H D. CROCKETT 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants Darrel D. Maynes, et al. 
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